The Impact of the Retirement Decision and Demographics on Pension Sustainability: A Dynamic Microsimulation Analysis by Patxot, Concepció et al.
The Impact of the Retirement Decision and Demographics on Pension Sustainability:
A Dynamic Microsimulation Analysis
International Journal of Microsimulation
Concepció Patxot
Departament de Teoria Econòmica, Universitat de Barcelona
cio.patxot@ub.edu
Meritxell Solé
Departament de Teoria Econòmica, Universitat de Barcelona
meritxell.sole@ub.edu
Guadalupe Souto
Departament d’Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
guadalupe.souto@uab.es
Martin Spielauer
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)
martin.spielauer@wifo.ac.at
ABSTRACT:
This paper investigates how retirement decisions, in interaction with demographic changes, impact 
on pension system sustainability. To do so, we introduce behaviour into a dynamic 
microsimulation model applied to the Spanish case. Specifically, the retirement decision is 
modelled using a reduced-form survival model that provides information on retirement haz-ards, 
which are then used to calculate times to retirement within the microsimulation model. This model 
allows us to account for behavioural responses. For example, the behavioural reac-
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tion to the 2011 reform improves pension system sustainability, despite individuals opting to
retire later to obtain higher benefits. The positive effect (increase in contributions and reduc-
tion in time spent in retirement) is greater than the negative effect (increase in pension levels).
Additionally, the model allows us to show how the positive effects of the education transition
and higher rates of female and older worker participation contribute to reducing the negative
impact of population ageing.
KEYWORDS: DYNAMIC MICROSIMULATION, PENSION REFORMS, BEHAVIOURAL
MODEL, AGEING
JEL classification: H53, H55, H68
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1 INTRODUCTION
Developed countries are facing a population ageing process that threatens the sustainability of 
their social protection programmes and their governments are seeking ways to uphold their 
welfare states against a backdrop of rising health and long-term care expenditure and an in-
creasing pension bill. According to the European Commission (2012) the demographic old-
age dependency ratio (people aged 65 or above relative to those aged 20–64) is projected to 
increase from 28 to 58%in the EU as a whole over the period 2010–60. In this respect, Spain 
is an extreme example of an abrupt population ageing process, with an old-age dependency 
ratio rising from 27 to 61%, albeit projected to occur a little later than in other European 
countries. Sustainability problems are worsened by the fact that the majority of welfare states 
– among them Spain – are based on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing system, which means 
public transfers will be sustained by a proportionally smaller cohort of workers. This is espe-
cially true of pension systems in which usual benefits are covered by raising an earmarked tax 
(social security contributions).
Concerns for reforms to make pension systems sustainable in the long-term are fully justi-
fied. Such proposals vary from the complete restructuring of the system – such as making the 
switch to a true or notional capitalisation system1. – to marginal adjustments in its legal pa-
rameters. Given the expected increase in the ratio of pensioners to contributors, all proposals
involve raising contributions and/or reducing pensions. Yet, there remains some scope for 
improvements on the demographic side. For example, a delay in the retirement age in line 
with increasing life expectancy is frequently proposed as a way to both boost contributions 
and reduce expenditure. Other options for raising contributions in a context of an increas-
ingly scarce labour force could involve an increase in fertility (which would have a long-run 
impact) and migration (with a short-run impact), and an increase in female workforce partici-
pation. Finally, the fact that workers will be more educated in the future may also contribute 
to boosting sustainability.
However, we should not ignore the fact that individuals react to reforms, and their behavioural 
responses may counter to some extent their effects. For this reason, models are needed to cap-
ture the determinants of the retirement decision, since their incorporation in pension simu-
lation models can improve predictions about long-term macroeconomic outputs. Likewise, 
the design of reform measures requires sound analytical tools. These tools need to be dynamic 
– to explicitly model lifecycle decisions, and they need to incorporate both macro and mi-
cro perspectives. For example, simulation models have recently been developed thanks to the 
growing availability of high quality databases and computing tools (see Spielauer (2011) for a 
description of microsimulation in the social sciences) and the use of microsimulation models 
in policy evaluation and, especially, pension reforms, has become widespread (see e.g.Keegan
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(2011); Borella and Moscarola (2010); Van Sonsbeek (2010); Stensnes and Stølen (2007); Bud-
delmeyer, Freebairn, and Kalb (2006) for recent examples).
Here, we introduce behavioural responses into a dynamic microsimulation model applied to 
Spain (“DyPeS”)2, using a non-behavioural version; and Patxot, Solé, and Souto (2017). Specif-
ically, we evaluate how individuals modify their retirement decision in response to the 2011 
reform3. This decision is estimated using a reduced-form model and the estimated hazards 
are implemented into the model to analyse the sustainability of the pension system during 
the demographic transition. The resulting model is one of very few behavioural dynamic 
microsimulators available. As explained in Section 4, there is a trade-off between the explana-
tory power of the econometric analysis provided by the retirement behaviour literature and 
the feasibility of implementation in behavioural microsimulation models.
The model enables us to identify which effects of a reform are related to the reactions of in-
dividuals to regulatory changes (see O’Donoghue et al. (2001), for a definition of behavioural 
models vs. statistical simulation). Moreover, it allows us to measure the impact of changes 
concomitant to the demographic transition (e.g., enhanced level of educational attainment 
and increased female participation) on sustainability.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional context of the Span-
ish pension system. Section 3 describes the retirement decision model and the econometric 
techniques employed. Section 4 presents the dynamic microsimulation model. Results are 
presented in Section 5 and, finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The public pension system is the main component of Spain’s welfare state. In 2014 spending 
on the system represented 10.5% of GDP compared to an OECD mean of 7.9%. Besides a 
non-contributory, means-tested system (a basic and assistance scheme), the pension system 
is primarily contributory. It is organised on a PAYG basis and includes pension benefits –
retirement, disability and survival – for those who meet eligibility requirements for age and 
past contributions to the system. The system comprises a general regime and several special 
regimes for specific occupations – self-employed, agriculture, sea, coal m ining. Moreover, in 
the general regime there are different contribution groups, mainly dependent on the workers’ 
level of qualification4.
Retirement pensions are the main expenditure, representing c. 7.4% of GDP. The benefit 
depends on the worker’s past contributions, which makes the system contributory – or Bis-
marckian – to some extent. Specifically, the initial pension (I P ) is determined by applying 
a percentage ( p), depending on the number of years of contribution (n), to the regulatory
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base (BR), defined as the average contribution base in the past. Moreover, a penalty for early
retirement (or a premium in case of delay) can also be applied (c c ):
I P = BR ∗ p(n) ∗ [1− c c(n)] (1)
Many partial reforms have been made since the system was introduced in 1967. Specifically,
the Eq [1] parameters have been modified to make the system more Bismarckian; yet, a fully 
contributory system has yet to be achieved. Moreover, retirement pensions (and contribu-
tions) are subject to upper and lower limits in the pursuit of equity but at the expense of its 
contributory nature. The latest major reform was implemented in 2011, and was aimed at 
reducing expenditure in a period of economic crisis characterised by a dramatic drop in con-
tributions. Below, we describe the main measures contained in this reform5:
a) The general retirement age was delayed from 65 to 67, although it remained at 65 for those 
with long working careers, i.e., over 38.5 years of contributions. b) The penalty for early
retirement and the premium for delayed retirement – cc in Eq [1] – were modified to encourage 
older workers to continue in the labour market. c) To boost the contributory nature of the 
system, the formula for obtaining the initial pension was modified: first, the number of years 
of past contributions considered in the BR rose from 15 to 25 and, second, the way in which
past years of contribution were considered was changed by making p(n) in Eq. [1] more 
linear, and by increasing the number of past years of contribution needed to obtain 100% of 
the BR from 35 to 37.
Given the significance of the modifications, a long transition (2013–27) was established before 
these reforms took full effect.
3 THE RETIREMENT DECISION
Generally, individuals react to changes that impact their living conditions by modifying their 
decisions. For example, they can change their behaviour in response to pension system re-
forms, by modifying their retirement decision to optimize their benefits. Indeed, given that 
retirement choices reflect individual balances between present and future income, leisure and 
risk perceptions, they can be modelled within the theoretical framework of the life-cycle the-
ory of consumption, based on utility maximization. This approach captures the impact of 
changes in the budget constraint on the retirement decision, given an individual’s consump-
tion and leisure preferences as reflected in the utility f unction. A  full structural estimation 
of this model requires the explicit modelling of all these factors, which in turn implies strong
6
parametric assumptions about these preferences. The approach has the advantage of afford-
ing a clear interpretation of results, but it poses major challenges of feasibility. In this regard, 
the seminal work of Miller (1984), Pakes (1984), Rust (1987), and Wolpin (1984) identified the 
conditions under which these dynamic discrete choice models were both feasible and relevant 
for solving key economic questions.
An alternative is to use a reduced-form approach – the one opted for here, primarily, because 
of the nature of the data employed. We use a rich administrative dataset for pensions and work 
histories, the Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales or MCVL (Continuous Sample of Work-
ing Lives). The MCVL combines administrative information from three sources – the census, 
the Social Security register and the tax records – and it contains a representative random sam-
ple of 4% of the population presenting Social Security records for each year – that is, it includes 
approximately 1,200,000 individuals for whom data are available about both their current and 
previous employment history, including their (gross) wages and benefits r eceived. Using a 
reduced-form model with this rich dataset allows us to obtain a precise picture of reactions 
to financial incentives. These administrative records are the result of the interaction between 
individuals’ preferences and constraints, on the one hand, and firms’ decisions, on the other. 
In this sense, the dataset does not capture heterogeneity in preferences and beliefs, but allows 
us to readily capture detailed changes in financial incentives and budget c onstraints. More-
over, a reduced-form hazard model allows for sudden shocks (such as, changes in earnings) to 
be included in the analysis more readily than is the case with a structural model. Finally, and 
most importantly, the need to implement the results of the estimation in a microsimulation 
tool requires a more flexible specification. The parametric assumptions regarding preferences, 
beliefs and heterogeneity required in a structural analysis are not easily extrapolated to future 
periods. In discussing these methodological issues, Stock and Wise (1990) discuss the gains in 
applicability of both approaches and derive a simplified structural model with the advantages 
of reduced-form models (the option value model). The potential applications of this model 
are numerous (Gruber and Wise (1999); Gruber and Wise (2005); Casey et al. (2003)).
We model retirement behaviour by introducing financial i ncentives, e mploying a  survival 
framework. In line with previous research for the US (Gruber and Wise (2005); Coile and Gru-
ber (2001); Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2003)), survival estimates highlight the role played 
by the economic incentives for retirement implicit in the pension scheme. Specifically, in the 
reduced-form approach retirement hazard is estimated as a function of individual character-
istics (age, education, etc.) and retirement incentives. Still, reduced-form models in form of 
discrete response or hazard models can be traced back to a utility model as shown by Stock 
and Wise (1990). Changes in income reflect changes in utility (avoiding to model consump-
tion), while preferences for leisure ca be captured by variables expressing impatience to retire. 
Including this reduced form retirement behavioural equation in our microsimulation model
7
allows us to define an ‘optimal time of retirement’ scenario coherent with current regulations 
and to compare it with the ‘non-behavioural’ scenario.
To define the incentives for inclusion in our behavioural model, we take as our starting point 
recent studies for Spain that estimate the effects of Social Security incentives using the same 
dataset as the one employed herein (i.e., the MCVL). Sánchez, Argimón, Botella, and González 
(2013) estimate Social Security Wealth (SSW), i.e., the present net value of net benefits received 
from the pension system; Social Security Accrual (SSA), i.e., the discounted change in SSW 
when postponing retirement one year; and, the Peak Value (PV), which compares this year’s 
SSW with the maximum SSW that can be attained in the future. The authors report that the 
coefficients of all three social security variables are statistically significant with the expected 
sign. However, the results regarding the effect of measures related to SSW appear somewhat 
mixed for Spain. It is well known (Gruber and Wise (2005)) that SSW might be endogenous 
and it may not be possible to separate the effects of financial incentives and the taste for work 
– both interacting with age. In this respect, several studies (based on a preliminary experi-
mental version of MCVL) report the limited effect of retirement incentives on the retirement 
decision, suggesting that age is the main determinant (Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín, and Peracchi 
(2004); Jiménez-Martín (2006)). More recently, García-Pérez, Jiménez-Martín, and Sánchez-
Martín (2013) extended the analysis of the MCVL and their results show that, when incentives 
are properly defined and problems such as individual heterogeneity are taken into account, in-
centives have a strong impact on labour market decisions, especially on retirement decisions. 
We estimated a similar model to that used in Sánchez et al. (2013) and found that the PV has 
no impact on the probability of retirement (see appendix A for more details). Thus, in our 
microsimulation model, we opted to include a set of incentives that are closer to those in 
García-Pérez et al. (2013). The latter authors specify a model that only considers the current 
pension benefits of retirees and changes in their pension r ights. We take a  similar approach 
by considering pension rights and the difference between the expected pension at its highest 
possible value and the pension if the worker retires in the current year. In line with García-
Pérez et al. (2013), the influence of minimum pensions on low-wage workers is also tracked. 
We also include current labour income as a financial incentive, which takes the form of wages, 
for employees, or unemployment benefit, for the unemployed. García-Pérez et al. (2013) also 
include a proxy of life-cycle wealth as a determinant of the marginal utility of wealth and, 
consequently, of the relative value of income versus leisure.
The other variables included in our model (apart from retirement incentives) are: level of ed-
ucation, labour status (employed/unemployed), an indicator as to whether the individual is a 
recipient of unemployment benefit, period of time to obtain the maximum pension, age on 
reaching the maximum pension, replacement rate, and a time counter that seeks to capture 
impatience. We also include a proxy for the state of the business cycle (unemployment rate).
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We expect financial incentives and variables related to taste for work and impatience to inter-
act, as is commonly assumed by economic theory: people seek to maximize their income, but
they prefer leisure to work. The time dimension operates discounting future gains in terms
of both leisure time and money (people are assumed to be impatient). The extent of inter-
play between these contradictory forces and the possible differences by group (education and
gender, mainly) are the focus of our analysis. People aged over 58 and fulfilling the eligibility
conditions compute their retirement hazards monthly, and the covariates that determine the
retirement decision are also updated monthly. First, individuals are assumed to claim their
pension benefit according to a survival model that includes personal characteristics and busi-
ness cycle indicators, but not financial incentives (non-behavioural model). These variables are
age, age squared, education level, last wage, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 during
the first year the individual is eligible and 0 otherwise and, finally, the unemployment rate.
This set of variables seeks to capture all the factors involved in any retirement decision and
under any regulatory framework. This means age, productivity issues and the individual’s
performance in the labour market, time preferences and business cycle considerations.
In both the behavioural and non-behavioural models, we estimate a piecewise constant ex-
ponential model in which the hazard is assumed constant within pre-specified survival time
intervals but the constants may differ for different intervals. This kind of semi-parametric
model is commonly used in a continuous time framework – the approach we adopt to exploit
the richness of our dataset – to avoid the assumptions about the shape of the hazard function
implied by parametric models. Then, the exponential model can be defined by:
θ(t ,Xt ) = θ0(t )exp(β
′Xt ) (2)


















where the baseline hazard rate t he t a is constant within each of the K intervals but differs
between intervals, X is a vector of variables (fixed or, if time-varying, constant within each 
interval) representing personal characteristics, working careers and macro-indicators that are
relevant for our model, b e t a is the vector of parameters we wish to estimate, and t represents 
time. We use a monthly panel dataset covering the period 2005–10, derived from the MCVL. It
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includes all individuals eligible for retirement during this period, excluding those who retired
due to collective agreements or forced to do so by regulation (unemployed who reach the
minimum retirement age).
Table 1 shows the results of the behavioural model. As expected, the retirement hazard in-
creases with age (at a decreasing rate), but the most powerful effect is that associated with the
variable “first year of eligibility”, which increases the hazard for both genders. This is con-
sistent with the fact that between 55 and 60% of people (depending on the year considered)
retire as soon as they can (via the “ordinary” retirement pathway). The unemployed and those
receiving unemployment benefit tend to retire later. As discussed, individuals are forced to re-
tire (via the “ordinary” pathway) if they are unemployed at the legal retirement age. In our
estimation we eliminated these enforced retirement events as they do not reflect real choices.
Hence, the unemployed present in our sample are mostly people eligible for early retirement,
observed before their ordinary retirement age. Variables related to financial incentives behave
as expected (see explanation above) and the effects of the replacement rate (individual ratio
of pension to last wage) and the minimum pension are especially strong. The effect of the
PV proxy is also very strong in the case of women (we compute changes in one euro). These
results are in line with those reported by García-Pérez et al. (2013), who show that greater
accrued pension rights are, as expected, associated with lower re-entry rates and higher re-
tirement rates. The effect of the economic crisis (measured using the unemployment rate) is
associated with delayed retirement for both genders.
Table 1: Retirement model
Men Women
Age 43.0764 17.41 ** 77.8685 13.92 **
Age Sq. 0.9717 -17.17 ** 0.9677 -13.69 **
Secondary studies(a) 1.0501 1.98 ** 1.1420 3.91 **
University studies 1.0625 1.87 ** 1.2708 3.64 **
First year retired 2.0422 9.92 ** 2.5447 9.47 **
Unemployed 0.3131 -1.72 ** 0.0000 -0.01
Unemployment benefit 0.9998 -1.84 * 1.0000 0.00
Wage (100€ change) 0.9994 -7.49 ** 0.9993 -3.65 **
PV(a) 0.9995 -23.74 ** 0.9992 -20.2 **
Time to max. pension 0.9301 -5.10 ** 0.9684 -1.55
Age at max. pension 1.0000 0.01 1.0000 0.00
Replacement rate 1.1461 2.18 ** 1.1985 1.24
Minimum pension 0.9259 -3.12 ** 0.8619 -4.44 **
Months since eligible(log) 2.6267 11.75 ** 3.1819 10.62 **
Unemployment rate 0.9857 -2.62 ** 0.9911 -1.11
Constant 0.0000 -17.71 ** 0.0000 -14.26 **
(a) Base category: less than secondary.
(b) Difference with respect to maximum pension, 100€ change.
Source: Author’s ellaboration.
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Men with higher education tend to remain less time in the labour market after becoming for-
mally eligible for retirement (the same effect is observed for women but it is not significant). 
In contrast, the less educated are more likely to be affected by periods of unemployment and 
non-participation, above all during years of crisis. This effect, combined with lower wages, 
may reduce their entry pension level, obliging them to work longer to achieve financial secu-
rity. As explained, the retirement choice reflects heterogeneous tastes for work and leisure, and 
different budget constraints. Longer working careers may reflect work and leisure preferences 
more aligned to remaining in the labour market (associated with the more highly educated 
and those earning higher wages). But retirement decisions also reflect budget constraints, sup-
posedly more so for the less educated, and thus, they work in the opposite direction.
We should mention at this point some of the limitations of our retirement model. Some 
variables that may be relevant when explaining retirement decisions are not included in our 
estimations. This is the case of marital status (as emphasized by Blau and Riphahn (1999)) and 
the partner’s incentives to retire, health status (as discussed in the seminal paper by Anderson 
and Burkhauser (1985)), private savings, and expectations about anticipated inheritances. The 
inclusion of these variables is not possible for two main reasons: on the one hand, problems of 
data availability (no data source combines work histories, retirement transitions and pensions 
with any of these variables for Spain); and, on the other hand, the design of the microsimu-
lation model. We opted to project individuals instead of households (pensions rights are, in 
Spain, individual), which complicates the modelling of the partner’s incentives. Yet, even if 
information had been available on health status and savings, projecting these variables into 
the future is beyond the scope of DyPes given its current stage of development. However, to 
test the extent to which health status (disability) and marital status (living with a person of 
similar age) might influence the retirement decision, we have estimated our model including 
these variables (see appendix E for an explanation). Other circumstances (that is, firm agree-
ments or regulations) that force people to retire are eliminated from the model. Our model 
only includes voluntary retirements, excluding those affected by collective agreements (firms 
and employees) and those with the obligation to retire due to unemployment status or other 
circumstances. In the microsimulation model, those forced to retire for legal requirements 
retire automatically, with no intervention of the behavioural model.
4 THE MICROSIMULATION MODEL
Microsimulation models that include behaviour in the retirement decision are scarce and het-
erogeneous in their modelling approach, since there is an inevitable trade-off between the ex-
planatory power of the econometric analyses found in the retirement behaviour literature and 
their feasibility of implementation in behavioural microsimulation models. Indeed, the latter
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can be intractable if there is no empirical correspondence for the many free parameters that 
would need to be specified in the m odel. As a result, microsimulation models are preferably 
endowed with simple – non-behavioural – rules for retirement: for example, assuming that 
individuals retire as soon as they are eligible (Borella and Moscarola (2010)) or aligning the 
transitions to the observed patterns (Dekkers et al. (2009);Leombruni and Richiardi (2006)). 
Recently, Tikanmäki, Sihvonen, and Salonen (2015) use dynamic microsimulation techniques 
to analyze the distributional impact of the forthcoming Finnish pension reform. Similarly 
to those mentioned before, it is a model without behavioural adjustments in which the age-
gender-specific behaviour i s obtained from a  macro model and the differences in transition 
probabilities between educational groups are extrapolated from the register data. In turn, the 
econometric literature on retirement behaviour accounts for the role played by the financial 
incentives embedded in the pension rule by integrating empirical evidence with life-cycle the-
ory – see, for example, Baker et al. (2003) for Canada, Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2002) for 
the United Kingdom, Coile and Gruber (2001) for the United States and García-Pérez et al.
(2013) and Sánchez et al. (2013) for Spain.
Our model herein combines both approaches. There have been previous attempts to intro-
duce behaviour into a microsimulation model. For example, Borella and Moscarola (2010) 
compared the results of a behavioural model with a scenario without behaviour in which peo-
ple retire as soon as possible. The retirement decision is modelled by estimating a probit model 
and the main money’s worth measures used are the present value of pension benefits (PVB) 
and the peak value (PV), defined as the maximum forecasted accrual at each age. In Van Sons-
beek (2010), the retirement decision is modelled using the option value (OV) approach, first 
suggested by Stock and Wise (1990), which combines individual data on wages and on state 
and private pension entitlements with individually varied option value parameters (time and 
leisure preferences and risk aversion). In this model, the retirement decision is taken defini-
tively at the age of 60, which does not allow the agent to update the changes observed in their 
final working p eriod. This is crucial for us to simulate changes in mature workers’ participa-
tion. In contrast, in our model, agents update expected pensions monthly until they retire, 
taking into account changing labour market conditions. Bianchi, Romanelli, and Vagliasindi 
(2003) use an individual reaction function, based on Stock and Wise’s option value model, in 
which the worker calculates the expected value of the utility of retiring today and in the future, 
using available information.
The construction of a microsimulation model involves several technical decisions, depen-
dent primarily on the question analysed and on data availability (see Li, O’Donoghue, et al.
(2013)). Here, the nature of the pension policy requires the use of a dynamic model – mean-
ing that it simulates the micro units over time. DyPeS has been developed using ModGen, a 
generic dynamic microsimulation programming language developed and maintained by Statis-
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tics Canada, and widely used in social science. DyPeS is a case-based model – one case being 
simulated after another, although the ModGen programming language also allows a time-based 
model to be derived, with all cases being simulated in each period. It is programmed in con-
tinuous time, though some of the events occur only once a year.
In order to project future pension expenditure, we need to start from an initial population. 
DyPeS begins with a sample of the individuals registered with Social Security in 2007, extracted 
from the MCVL. The year 2007 is chosen as the base year and the reference point for most 
data, thus avoiding distortions attributable to the effects of the crisis. For life expectancy 
projections, we use data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). Later on, 
we have to add new individuals born after the baseline and whose working careers are fully 
simulated. The first step in the simulation is to assign individuals with a level of education. 
For those present in the MCVL born before 1991 the level of education level is recorded, 
but for “future” individuals (born after 1991), the level attained is assigned randomly so as to 
reproduce the educational distribution observed and foreseeable by the Spanish Ministry of 
Education (Instituto de Evaluación (2010)) for the Spanish population (see Section 5). Second, 
once individuals reach the age of 16, they are exposed to the probability of entering the labour 
market by age, gender, education and initial qualification level (obtained from the MCVL).
Third, when individuals enter the labour market, they are exposed to labour market tran-
sitions (based on those observed in the MCVL). Wages grow according to a Mincer equation 
(estimation results provided as supplementary material Table B.1). The set of explanatory vari-
ables includes, apart from the previous year’s wage, personal characteristics – age, age squared 
and migrant status, productivity indicators – education, contribution group and experience, 
business cycle indicators – unemployment rate, and cohort effects that are supposed, for the 
sake of simplicity, to be linear. In this estimation, we use a panel dataset covering the period 
1997–2010, based on the MCVL, and information on macroeconomic indicators provided by 
the INE.
Finally, as explained in Section 3, the retirement module determines whether an eligible in-
dividual actually retires based on two alternative criteria: by considering financial incentives 
or not (behavioural vs. non-behavioural model). In both cases, at the age of 59, agents start 
computing their potential pensions and eligibility conditions, considering all available retire-
ment routes and weighting their potential pensions by the probability of being unemployed in 
future years. Unemployment rate projections are taken from European Commission (2012))6.
5 RESULTS
This section reports the results of the microsimulator DyPeS together with the behavioural 
reactions of individuals estimated in the previous section. The baseline situation is charac-
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terised (5.1) and the impact of behavioural responses to the 2011 pension reform in Spain is
analysed (5.2). Different counterfactual scenarios are estimated in order to evaluate the impact
of demography on pension sustainability.
5.1 Baseline scenario
Our baseline scenario incorporates behaviour in the retirement decision and the effects of the
2011 reform. It seeks to reproduce the “real” situation insofar as the 2011 reform had already
been implemented when our projections were made, based on the behavioural model that
best replicates the retirement decision. In this respect, other scenarios – without behaviour,
without reform – act as counterfactuals.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of wages and pensions over recent decades and their projected
growth rates. The average growth rate of wages between 1995 and 2008 was 3.49% and their
projected future growth is 3%. Remarkably, pensions have grown at a rate higher than that
of wages: 4.7% between 1995 and 2008, which has been corrected for the period 2008–60
(with an average growth rate of 3.1%). The main reason for the past increase is the so-called
“substitution effect” – new pensioners obtained systematically higher pay-outs. Moreover, the
minimum pension has also grown at a rate above the average.
Figure 1: Average wage and pension growth rates (1995-2060)
Sources: (1995-2008), Annual Economic Database. European Commission and Spanish Social Security. (2008-2060), authors’ elaboration.
The year 2007 is selected as the base year to prevent projections being permanently affected 
by the 2008 economic crisis. However, at the same time, the effects of the crisis cannot be 
ignored. Hence, we opt for an ad hoc simulation of a reduction in the growth rate of wages and 
a temporary increase (decrease) in the job destruction (creation) rate. Given the uncertainty 
about the duration of the crisis, we assume a slow recovery ending in 2018. The changes 
observed in the job destruction and creation rates during the crisis (FEDEA (2012)) are applied 
when constructing the transition hazards (unemployment and reemployment) of our model 
from 2008 to 2018. An explanation of the overall effects of the crisis on sustainability and 
on job creation and destruction rates between 2008 and 2012 are provided as supplementary 
material in section C.
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5.2 Behavioural responses to reform measures
We report the results obtained from simulating the effects of the 2011 pension reform (see
Section 2 for more details) in which the baseline scenario includes behaviour and the impact
of the crisis. Besides delaying the general age of retirement from 65 to 67, the rest of the mea-
sures aimed at boosting the system’s contributory nature, or the degree of proportionality
between contributions and pensions, thus strengthening the Bismarckian nature of the sys-
tem. This objective has been present on the Spanish reform agenda since first expressed in
the 1995 Toledo Pact7. Interestingly, such measures can have either positive or negative effects
on pension rights. They have positive effects on sustainability and potentially positive effects
on redistribution. Given that our analysis incorporates more than one dimension, we first
present the effects of the behavioural reactions on the most relevant indicators. This allows
us to test whether agents behave as expected. Second, the effects of the 2011 reform on both
scenarios – with and without behaviour – are compared. Finally, the effects of the different
measures of the 2011 reform are analysed separately for the behavioural scenario.
Figure 2: Behavioural versus non-behavioural model
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Figure 2 shows the pure effects of introducing behaviour into the retirement event. As ex-
pected, initial pensions are higher when individuals can react to financial i ncentives. Like-
wise, panel B Figure 2 indicates that, when behaviour is considered, individuals tend to retire 
when the gains in entry pensions are higher and to delay retirement during years of crisis. 
This makes sense for several reasons. First, if we examine the model without behaviour we 
see that most of the variables – and with powerful effects as shown by the estimations – impel 
individuals to retire earlier. Only the most sophisticated indicators related to the financial in-
centives introduced in the behavioural model lead workers to consider the future benefits of 
waiting for a higher pension. Second, the effect of the crisis on working careers seems marked, 
pointing to the notable benefits to be gained from continuing to work after the crisis.
We describe the effects of the 2011 reform in both scenarios – with and without behaviour 
– in Figures 3 and 4. Panels A) and B) of Figure 3 show the effects of the reform on the 
level of entry pension. In both scenarios, the reform is associated with an increase in initial 
pensions (until 2029 in the behavioural and until 2030 in the non-behavioural scenario). In the
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Figure 3: Effects of the 2011 reform on the level and number of entry pensions (change in %)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Figure 4: Effects of the 2011 reform on the level and number of entry pensions (change in %)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
behavioural model, we observe a short period (2008-2010) of decrease that breakes the trend. 
We then observe a decrease in entry pensions that seems to be corrected at the end of the 
microsimulation period. Both the increase in entry pension associated with the reform and 
the further decrease are greater in the behavioural model, which is coherent with the results 
in Figure 2. Panels C) and D) detail the contribution of each reform measure. The reform 
in the number of years used to compute the BR (increasing gradually from 15 to 25) seems to 
account for the increase in pensions in both scenarios. This effect is surprising at first glance. 
The expected effect of this measure depends on the shape of the lifetime real earnings profile8. 
If it is increasing, when the BR takes more years from the past this means a reduction in the
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wage level considered and, hence, a cut in pension rights. Yet, earnings do not always grow 
at the same rate across the life cycle. The typical profile can be expected to grow more at the 
beginning, to stabilise around the age of 50 and, thereafter, to remain constant or possibly 
worsen, if the career is interrupted by unemployment. Hence, the effect of this measure can 
be a small cut or even an increase in the pension benefit if wages are not growing in real terms. 
The unexpected increase in pensions observed during the crisis is probably due to the fact that 
the increase from 15 to 25 years meant adding years of contributions unaffected by the crisis.
The delay in statutory retirement from 65 to 67 does not result in a cut in entry pensions
until approximately 2030. Before then, the effect is unremarkable. The change in p(n) means 
a decrease in the level of initial pensions, reaching almost 2% in the case of the non-behavioural 
and in the behavioural model. This average negative effect likely conceals positive and negative
effects for those with different working careers. In general, reforms of p(n) have potential 
effects on redistribution. Nevertheless, in this particular case they are small, due to the scale 
of the reform. Changes in the incentives for delayed retirement are associated with higher 
pensions in both scenarios.
Figure 4 describe the number of entry pensions. The 2011 reform produces an apparently 
erratic trend in this number in the behavioural scenario. The only measure that seems to 
incentivise people to retire earlier during the first years of the simulation is the change in the 
computation of the BR. This is consistent with the intuition explained above: if the sum of the 
earlier years of working history used to compute the average base are “better”, the incentives 
to continue working (probably with relatively lower wages) are weaker. The delay in the 
retirement age causes, as expected, fewer retirements during the first part of the simulation, 
but is offset during the period 2042–53. Unsurprisingly, the only measure that has an effect 
on the time of retirement in the non-behavioural scenario is the “compulsory” one: delay in 
retirement age from 65 to 67. In this scenario, agents are not allowed to use retirement time to 
react to the changes in financial incentives. Consequently, other measures produce no changes.
The most general indicator, which summarises the different effects of the pension reform, is 
the ratio between total pension expenditure and the wage bill. Figure 5 shows the percentage 
changes in this ratio and the contribution of each measure. In the behavioural scenario, the 
ratio falls due to the introduction of the reform over the whole period, except for the period 
2014–32. As expected, the change in the computation of the BR is – except during the initial 
years – associated with a higher ratio, as is the increase in the retirement premium for delayed 
retirement, whereas the delay in retirement age cuts this ratio, and is the only measure that
significantly improves sustainability (changes i n p(n) operate in the same direction, but their 
effects are weak).
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Figure 5: Effects of the 2011 reform on the pension expenditure to wage bill ratio (change in %)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
5.3 The role of demographics
Demographics play a key role in the evolution of the pension systems. Besides ageing, the 
role of the education transition (i.e., a progressively higher educational attainment) and the 
increase in female labour market participation are increasingly relevant. Below, to evaluate 
their respective roles, we present the results of two counterfactual scenarios.
Education
Educational attainment is modelled in two different ways: for individuals already in the start-
ing population and born after 1978 (who supposedly have finished their studies by 2007, the 
year of the sample) the information is recorded as a variable; for future generations, the distri-
bution of population by education level is imputed according to official data and projections 
from the MEC. Figure 6 shows Spain’s education transition (ending with the cohort born in 
1978), with rates of university studies close to 45% for women and 35% for men. Our projec-
tions assume these high rates will be maintained in the future (given that supposing further 
improvements would be unrealistic).
Yet, despite this increase in the educational attainment of Spanish youth, its impact on wages 
and future pensions is not direct as it is mediated by labour market performance. Indeed, it 
is quite plausible that the labour market will not translate this increase in human capital into 
better working careers (higher labour force participation and higher wages). In our model, ed-
ucational attainment, labour force participation and working careers are closely linked so that 
a level of educational attainment is first assigned to individuals (as described above); second, 
entry contribution groups are assigned according to observed hazards by level of education 
and sex; and, finally, unemployment and reemployment hazards are held dependent on the
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Figure 6: Educational attainment by gender
Source: Authors’ elaboration from MEC (2010).
level of qualification. Thus, the more highly educated rise faster to reach higher occupation
levels and are more likely to end up in the highest contribution groups.
Figure 7 shows how, in the baseline scenario, the proportion of educated people employed in
the highest contribution group increases with time, supposing an increase in the capacity of the
labour market to absorb improvements in human capital. The only official data available on
employment for those with tertiary education to contextualize our scenario come from Insti-
tuto Nacional de Estadística (2014) and the OECD (2009). These reports contain employment
information up to 2014 for those graduating four years previously. Yet, our scenario is coher-
ent with these data sources, reporting employment rates in the highest contribution group of
19 and 22% for women and men, respectively.
Figure 7: Population (in %) with university studies employed in the highest contribution group
Source: Source: Authors’ elaboration.
To verify the impact of changes in education on the pension system, two counterfactual sce-
narios are simulated. The first supposes that the observed education transition did not occur, 
so the education distribution of those born in 1950 (observed in our starting subsample) ap-
plies to all subsequent generations (lower education, LE-scenario). This distribution implies 
rates of 11, 41 and 48% for university, secondary and below secondary studies, respectively, 
for women, and rates of 15, 48 and 37% for men. In contrast, the second scenario supposes 
that the increase in human capital is fully translated into higher occupation rates in the highest 
contribution group, that is, the scenario supposes that all workers with university education 
rise to the highest contribution group in the second transition (absence of over-education, 
AO-scenario).
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Not unexpectedly, the results of these two scenarios present opposing pictures of the average
pension evolution and its relation to wages. Panels A and B in Figure 8 show the effects of
lowering educational attainment on the average pension and the ratio of pension expenditure
to the wage bill. During the first period of this projection, lower education levels translate into
lower wages, weakening the sustainability of the pension system. After 2045, the situation is
reversed, as less educated workers retire with lower pension benefits (lower wages during their
careers results in lower pensions from 2035 on).
The effects of the second scenario point in the opposite direction and are more sizable (panels
C and D in Figure 8). The “pure” effect of Spain’s education transition involves an increase in
the average pension, reaching growth rates close to 8% in 2050. The initial improvement in
the system’s sustainability is even more notable, with reductions in the ratio of total pension
expenditure to total wages close to 16% during the initial period of simulation. As in the first
scenario, the situation is reversed after 2045, when the more highly educated cohorts – who
have been in the highest contribution group with the highest wage levels – retire.
Figure 8: The effect of education on pensions (changes in %)
Notes: LE represents the “lower education” scenario and AO the “absence of overeducation” scenario as explained in the text.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Female labour participation
In the DyPeS model, labour force participation is the result of various interactions: entry
hazards by education, sex and contribution group; changes in contribution groups by contri-
bution group of origin and sex; and unemployment and reemployment hazards by sex and 
contribution group. The modelling is conducted using observed hazards for 2007. Insofar as 
no alignments are made in this baseline scenario to adjust results to any reference scenario, the
resulting employment and participation rates are the “pure” result of interacting the increase 
in human capital with labour market transitions.
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Before assigning individuals to a contribution group, DyPeS assigns them an educational level
based on official data, capturing in the process the significant increase in Spain’s educational
attainment. This increase in human capital has an effect on labour force participation. In
particular, the increasing educational levels of women (surpassing those of men) have their
counterpart in relatively high female employment rates (see panel A) of Figure 9). While these
rates are strongly affected by the increase in human capital and remain similar to or even higher
than those for men throughout almost the whole period, unemployment rates also remain
significantly higher for women (see panel b) of Figure 9). This reflects the fact that women
are more likely to be affected by periods of unemployment, although this is partly offset by
their increasing labour force participation in the form of transitions from non-participation
to employment (note, employment rates are calculated over the total population of young
people, including non-participants, while unemployment rates are calculated considering only
the active population).
Figure 9: Labour force evolution (2008-2060). Baseline
Source: Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The impact of this situation is analysed in a hypothetical scenario in which women present
the same unemployment and reemployment hazards as men. Figure 10 shows that the effects
of this scenario on the pension system’s sustainability are sizable. However, while the impact
on the average pension paid is only relevant at the end of the simulation period, the effect
on the ratio of total pension expenditure to the wage bill (reflecting the higher contributions
associated with increased female participation) are notable from the outset. As in the case of
improved labour market performance, the situation is reversed at the end of the simulation,
when women with longer careers (and higher average contributions) retire.
Figure 10: The effect of higher female participation on pensions (changes in %)
Source: Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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6 FINAL REMARKS
The sustainability of pension systems in most industrialised countries is threatened by demo-
graphic ageing. However, in parallel, other demographic characteristics are changing and may 
have a counter effect on sustainability. Two obvious examples are shifts in the labour market 
caused by an increase in the participation of older workers and women and the improvement 
in education levels. Similarly, the behavioural reaction of these heterogeneous agents to policy 
adjustments may well modify the impact of policies.
As such, there is an undoubted need for sound simulation models that can project pension ex-
penditure and evaluate the effects of potential reforms. In this regard, the necessity of captur-
ing the behaviour of agents that present different characteristics requires the use of microsim-
ulation models. With the progressive availability of longitudinal microdata and enhanced 
computation methods, the most innovative models can aim at capturing the behavioural re-
sponse of individuals to retirement incentives. In this paper, we have introduced individual 
behaviour into a dynamic microsimulation model applied to Spain (DyPeS). The retirement 
decision is modelled using a reduced-form survival model that provides information on retire-
ment hazards. These are then introduced into the microsimulation model to estimate times 
of retirement. DyPeS is applied to a rich administrative dataset (the MCVL) produced by the 
Spanish Social Security. The model reproduces the main life-cycle events that affect pensions: 
birth, entry into the labour market, unemployment, retirement and death. DyPeS is a case-
and population-based model, and was modelled in continuous time. It was implemented using 
ModGen, a programming language developed by Statistics Canada.
DyPeS allows us to simulate the 2011 measures reforming the Spanish pension system. Two 
of these aimed at increasing its contributory nature (by raising the number of years needed 
to compute the initial pension and by changing their weight in the formula, making it more 
proportional). A second measure aimed at reducing early retirement and promoting delayed 
retirement (by increasing the penalty in the case of the former and the premium in the case 
of the latter). Finally, the main measure was the delay to the general retirement age from 
65 to 67. Our results show that accounting for individuals’ behavioural responses enhances 
pension system sustainability. Specifically, the total pension expenditure to wage bill ratio, 
which increases until 2036 in the non-behavioural model, would initially fall until 2022 and 
only increase in the period 2022–31. Interestingly, the delay in retirement age has the most 
significant effect on pension expenditure, while measures modifying the computation of the 
initial pension for new retirees have a limited impact.
The model also allows us to evaluate the impact of other demographic characteristics on pen-
sion system sustainability. Specifically, the role of changes in educational attainment and fe-
male participation can be analysed. In relation to the former, we examine two hypothetical
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scenarios, one that reverses the education transition and another that assumes all qualified
workers find employment in the highest contribution group. Results show that education
and, more specifically, the capacity of the labour market to absorb qualified workers, do mat-
ter. Higher levels of educational attainment mean higher wages in the short and medium
term, reducing significantly the pension expenditure to wage bill ratio until 2050. Yet, they
also imply higher pension benefits in the distant future, but with a limited impact on sustain-
ability. In contrast, the lower education scenario produces a marked increase in the ratio until
2042, given the lower wages financing pensions. Sustainability only improves when the lower
educated workers retire on correspondingly lower pensions.
In the case of female participation, we examine a hypothetical scenario in which women have
the same unemployment and reemployment hazards as men. Again, the effects on pension
sustainability are notable, showing that the labour market plays a critical role in the evolution
of pension sustainability.
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NOTES
1The possibility of switching to a funded system is limited by the so-called transition problem: the initial gift 
given to generations who did not contribute and received a pension now needs to be offset by a double burden 
on current workers, who need to maintain the old PAYG system and contribute to the new one. Some 
countries have opted for some kind of notional funding, which might be considered a more sophisticated way 
of introducing a defined-contribution system
2Examples of use of Dypes can be found in Fernández-Díaz, Patxot, and Souto (2013)
3Details about the reform of the Spanish pension system implemented in 2011 can be found in Section 2. The 
most significant measure was the delay in the general retirement age from 65 to 67
4Contribution groups are classified by qualification level and contribution base thresholds: Group 1) Engineers, 
University Graduates and Senior Management Personnel; Group 2) Engineering Technicians. Experts and 
Assistants with university degree; Administrative and workshop managers; Group 3) Unskilled Assistants, 
Administrative Officials, Subordinates; Administrative Assistants; and, Group 4) unqualified part-time workers 
(First and second degree skilled workers, third degree skilled workers and Specialists and Unskilled labourers)
25
5The 2011 reform also announced the eventual introduction of a “sustainability factor” to cope with rising 
levels of life expectancy, albeit in a somewhat vague fashion. This was eventually regulated in 2013
6For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the possibility of an individual returning to the labour force
after retirement, given the low incidence of this occurrence in Spain. In Spain, besides partial retirement, there
are various legal pathways back into the labour force following retirement. However, it is still too early to
evaluate the effects of these measures which, for the time being, have had very limited impact
7The Toledo Pact, signed in 1995, by Spain’s main political forces, agreeing to a set of recommendations to
underpin reforms guaranteeing the sustainability of the Social Security System
8The relevant magnitude is real wages (and, hence, contributions), as the formula to compute BR updates wages
to include inflation two years prior to retirement
